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ARTICLES
NEA V. FINLEY: A DECISION IN SEARCH OF A
RATIONALE
LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR. *
I. INTRODUCTION
For the better part of a decade, debate has raged over whether Congress can
constitutionally restrict, or at least influence, the ability of the National
Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) to award grants to artists and institutions for
the creation or display of art work that a significant segment of the public would
consider highly offensive.1 In the October 1997 Term, the Supreme Court, by
an 8-1 margin in NEA v. Finley,2 upheld section 954(d), a 1991 congressional
amendment to the NEA Act that requires the Chairperson of the NEA to ensure
that, in establishing regulations and procedures for assessing artistic excellence
and artistic merit, “general standards of decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public” are taken into consideration.3
Perhaps Finley is best understood as a prudential decision validating a
political compromise that sought to, and has largely succeeded in, ending the
*  Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.A. 1970, Southern Methodist
University; J.D. 1973, University of Michigan.
1. The NEA controversy has been described in great detail elsewhere. See, e.g, John H. Garvey,
Black and White Images, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (1993); Craig Alford Masback,
Independence vs. Accountability: Correcting the Structural Defects in the National Endowment for the
Arts, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 177 (1992).
2. 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
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arts funding controversy, as well as insulating the NEA from further and
possibly fatal attack. If these were the goals of Congress and the Court, only
time will tell whether their efforts resulted in complete success. As a matter of
constitutional law, however, the Court confronted a very messy area of First
Amendment jurisprudence and left it even messier.
From a doctrinal and theoretical standpoint, Finley is extraordinarily
unsatisfying. Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the majority makes many salient
points, but it fails to pull them together into a coherent rationale. Glaring
contradictions in the majority opinion suggest that it was the product of a Court
in agreement as to the result but not as to a rationale. Much of the confusion in
the opinion seems quite deliberate, as if to suggest that the Court decided to
reach a result it found difficult to justify under existing precedent, thus
producing an opinion that through obscurity might cause as little damage as
possible to the existing doctrinal framework. Justice Scalia, in concurrence, and
Justice Souter, in dissent, demonstrated that a clearer and more principled
opinion than the majority’s could be written either to uphold or invalidate the
legislation. Thus, although the issue was difficult, it was hardly intractable.
This Article analyzes the opinions in Finley, speculates on the significance
of the case, and suggests an alternative rationale for the decision that has both
advantages and disadvantages over the Court’s opinion. Part II provides a brief
history of the arts funding controversy and the Finley litigation. Part III
examines the three opinions in Finley, relying heavily on the incisive critiques of
the majority opinion developed by Justices Scalia and Souter. Part IV discusses
the dynamics of the Finley opinion as an exercise in Supreme Court decision
making. Part V considers the doctrinal impact of Finley on viewpoint
discrimination and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Finally, Part VI
offers a doctrinal rationalization of Finley that I believe better captures the
essence of the controversy in Finley and considers whether that rationalization
would have been a preferable approach.
II. PRELUDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
A. The Arts Funding Controversy and Congressional Response
The incidents giving rise to the arts funding controversy of the 1990s have
been described in detail elsewhere, necessitating only a brief summary here.4
4. See supra note 1.
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Congress created the NEA in 1965 as a vehicle to assist in funding the arts.5
Grant applications are reviewed by advisory panels, which in turn make
recommendations to the NEA Chairperson.6 The program was not particularly
controversial until the NEA awarded two specific grants: the first to the Institute
of Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania to present a
retrospective of the photographs of the late Robert Mapplethorpe; and the
second to the Southwest Center for Contemporary Art, which in turn awarded a
grant to an artist named Andres Serrano.7 Most of the Mapplethorpe
photographs were uncontroversial. A segment titled the X Portfolio, however,
featured a number of sexually explicit images, including a young girl with her
vagina exposed and a man with a bullwhip protruding from his rectum.8
Serrano used his grant money to produce a photograph of a crucifix immersed
in urine entitled Piss Christ.9 The political fallout that occurred once these
grants attracted public attention enveloped the NEA in controversy for the better
part of a decade.
Congress responded by deleting forty-five thousand dollars, the amount of
the grants for the Mapplethorpe and Serrano exhibits, from the NEA
appropriation bill the following year.10 Moreover, it added a clause prohibiting
the use of NEA funds
to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of
the [NEA] . . . may be considered obscene, including but not limited to,
depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of
children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a
whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.11
The NEA implemented this provision by requiring grantees to certify that
they would not expend any of the funds received in violation of these
limitations.12 A federal district court invalidated this certification requirement
after finding the requirement both unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth
Amendment and an unconstitutional condition on freedom of speech under the
5. See National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209,
§ 5(a), 79 Stat. 845, 846 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(a) (1994)).
6. See 20 U.S.C. § 959(c).
7. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2172.
8. See Garvey, supra note 1, at 190.
9. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2172.
10. See Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 738-42 (making appropriations
for Department of Interior and related agencies for fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1990).
11. Id. § 304(a), 103 Stat. at 741.
12. See Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 776 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
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First Amendment.13 In addition, Congress established a temporary Independent
Commission to study the art funding issue and to report on the need for further
changes to the statute or procedures.14
In September of 1990 the Independent Commission, which had taken
testimony from art and constitutional law experts, reported back to Congress
and recommended several procedural changes to the grant-making process.15
After lengthy debate, Congress adopted several of the procedural changes
recommended by the Commission.16 In addition, it amended the NEA Act’s
Statement of Findings and Purposes to provide that “[t]he arts and the
humanities belong to all the people of the United States”17 and public funding of
the arts “should contribute to public support and confidence in the use of
taxpayer funds.”18 Finally, Congress enacted section 954(d), the provision at
issue in Finley, which provides:
No payment shall be made under this section except upon application
therefor which is submitted to the National Endowment for the Arts in
accordance with regulations issued and procedures established by the
Chairperson. In establishing such regulations and procedures, the
Chairperson shall ensure that–
(1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which
applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public; and
(2) applications are consistent with the purpose of this section. Such
regulations shall clearly indicate that obscenity is without artistic merit, is
not protected speech, and shall not be funded.19
John Frohnmayer, the Chairperson of the NEA, maintained that the agency
could comply with these requirements simply by ensuring that the membership
on the review panels reflected the diversity of the Nation.20
13. See id.
14. See Act of Oct. 23, 1989 § 304(c), 103 Stat. at 742.
15. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2173.
16. See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, sec. 318, § 103(e)-(i), 104 Stat. 1915, 1964-66
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954(i)-(l) (1994)).
17. Id. § 101, 104 Stat. at 1961.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 103(b), 104 Stat. at 1963.
20. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2173-74.
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B. The Finley Case
Four performance artists—Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and
Tim Miller—applied for NEA grants before the 1989 amendments.21 An
advisory panel initially recommended approving the grants. The Chairperson,
however, sent three applications back to the panel for reconsideration, and
although the advisory panel again recommended approving all four applications,
the National Council on the Arts recommended denying them all and the NEA
followed the Council’s recommendation.22 The four artists filed suit alleging
violation of their First Amendment rights. After Congress passed section 954(d)
in 1990, the artists amended their complaint to challenge that section as well.23
Early in the litigation, the NEA settled the individual “as applied” claims of the
four artists by paying them the amounts of the contested grants plus costs and
attorneys’ fees.24 In 1992 the federal district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment invalidating section 954(d) as unconstitutional on its
face on the grounds that it was overbroad under the First Amendment and vague
under the Fifth Amendment.25 I  the process, the district court rejected the
NEA’s position that it could comply with the statute simply by ensuring that the
membership on the review panels reflected the diversity of the Nation.26 Ins ead,
the district court concluded that Congress had instructed the NEA explicitly to
consider “decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values” in the process of
reviewing each grant application.27 The court enjoined the enforcement of the
provision, and that injunction continued in force until the Supreme Court’s
decision six years later.28
In 1996 a divided Ninth Circuit affirmed.29 It agreed that the statute
mandated substantive consideration of decency and respect in the grants process
rather than procedural implementation through the membership of the review
panels.30 The court held that the criteria of decency and respect for diverse
21. See id. at 2174.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1476 (C.D. Calif. 1992).
26. See id. at 1470-71.
27. Id. at 1470.
28. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *15, NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168
(1998) (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 156955 (Mar. 31, 1998) (Oral Argument of Seth P.
Waxman on behalf of Petitioners).
29. See Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996).
30. See id. at 676-77.
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beliefs and values were unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause.31 In addition, it held that these criteria discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint and that the Government failed to show that such
discrimination was essential to the achievement of a compelling state interest.32
The court rejected the contention that protecting the public from indecent speech
or protecting the taxpayer from unwanted expenditures constituted compelling
state interests.33
Judge Kleinfield dissented, arguing that the NEA could constitutionally
consider viewpoint-based criteria such as decency and respect for diverse beliefs
and values in a competitive grant program, even though it could not apply such
criteria in a noncompetitive grant program or in a regulatory or criminal
statute.34 Three judges published a dissent from the denial of rehearing en
banc.35
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth
Circuit decision in an opinion by Justice O’Connor. Justice Scalia wrote a
separate concurrence joined by Justice Thomas. Only Justice Souter dissented.
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
NEA v. Finley was one of the most closely watched cases of the 1997
Supreme Court Term. The issue of NEA funding had been a matter of public
debate for almost a decade. Scholars had analyzed the constitutional issues in
great detail.36 Both art organizations and family values groups filed amicus
briefs.37 The Court resolved the issue, but without the clarity for which many
31. See id. at 680.
32. See id. at 681-83.
33. See id. at 683 n.23.
34. See id. at 684-85.
35. See Finley v. NEA, 112 F.3d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir. 1997) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
36. See, e.g., OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996); Lee C. Bollinger, Public Institutions of
Culture and the First Amendment: The New Frontier, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103 (1995); David Cole,
Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1996); Robert M.
O’Neil, Artist Grants and Rights: The NEA Controversy Revisited, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 85 (1991); Robert C.
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government
Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543 (1996); Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content:
Can It Play an Appropriate Role in Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L.J. 1209 (1993).
37. Amicus Briefs in support of respondents were filed on behalf of the New School for Social
Research and the Brennan Center for Justice, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents, NEA
v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 3223 (Jan. 5, 1998); Volunteer
Lawyers for the Arts, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Finley (No. 97-371),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/1
p1 Bloom.doc 05/20/99   11:42 AM
1999] NEA V. FINLEY 7
had doubtlessly hoped. It is worth working through the opinion in some detail in
order to understand the extent to which the Court’s explanations are slippery,
ambiguous, and incomplete.
A. The Majority Opinion
1. The Meaning of the Statute
Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The meaning
of the section 954(d) obligation to “take into consideration” decency and respect
for diverse beliefs and values had been debated throughout the litigation. From
the outset, the NEA had argued that it could discharge this obligation simply by
ensuring that the membership on the review panels reflected national diversity.
Both the district court and the court of appeals, however, decisively rejected this
reading. Like the lower courts, Justice Souter’s dissent readily disposed of this
reading as inconsistent with the text and legislative history, as well as redundant
because another statutory provision already required the Chairperson to
consider diversity in selecting the panels.38
The majority dodged the issue by noting that it need not evaluate the NEA’s
interpretation because the statute was constitutional on its face even if construed
more broadly.39 The majority opinion is remarkably vague with regard to what
exactly the statutory language entails. It seems to conclude, however, that when
Congress directed the Chairperson to consider decency and respect, it was
simply directing him to think about these factors in the course of making a
available in 1998 WL 47261 (Feb. 6, 1998); Twenty-Six Arts, Broadcast, Library, Museum and
Publishing Amici, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Finley (No. 97-371), available
in 1998 WL 63172 (Feb. 6, 1998); Claes Oldenberg et al., Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Respondents, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 47599 (Feb. 6, 1998); Family Research
Institute of Wisconsin, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Finley (No. 97-371),
available in  1998 WL 47273 (Feb. 6, 1998); Rockefeller Foundation, Brief as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Respondents, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 55169 (Feb. 6, 1998);
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Respondents, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 47259 (Feb. 6, 1998); and American
Association of University Professors et al., Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Finley
(No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 47257 (Feb. 6, 1998). Amicus Briefs in Support of Petitioner NEA
were filed on behalf of Morality in Media, Amicus Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner,
Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 3223 (Jan. 5, 1998); and National Family Legal Foundation,
Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioiner, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 6553
(Jan. 9, 1998).
38. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2188-89 (Souter, J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 2175-76.
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decision and to weigh them in the balance,40 but not treat them as preclusive in
and of themselves.41 In other words, a panel and the Chairperson could find a
particular project indecent and void of respect for diverse beliefs and values and
yet still award the grant on the basis of the project’s artistic excellence. This
construction would seem to be the most natural reading of the phrase “take into
consideration.” As Justice O’Connor noted, “[w]hen Congress has in fact
intended to affirmatively constrain the NEA’s grant-making authority, it has
done so in no uncertain terms”—for example, the prohibition against awarding
grants for obscene works.42 Neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Souter necessarily
rejected the Court’s interpretation of the statute.
Justice Scalia began his opinion with the comment that “‘[t]he operation was
a success, but the patient died.’ What such a procedure is to medicine, the
Court’s opinion in this case is to the law. It sustains the constitutionality of 20
U.S.C. 954(d)(1) by gutting it.”43
The problem with the Court’s treatment of the statute is not that the Court
read the decency and respect language as merely hortatory in nature, but rather
that it simply avoided committing to any interpretation of the statute
whatsoever. It seemed to assume that section 954(d) has some type of
substantive impact, but it refused to say what. Contrary to Justice Scalia’s
remarks, the Court didn’t gut the statute, it simply ignored it.
From the easily supportable conclusion that “consideration” is not equivalent
to per se prohibition, the Court reasoned that the factors to be taken into
consideration—decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values—are not
intended to “disallow any particular viewpoints.”44 The Court noted that the
legislation was bipartisan in nature, a compromise position designed to counter
proposals to abolish the NEA and seemingly influenced by the Independent
Commission’s cautions regarding the use of independently preclusive criteria.45
Perhaps the Court simply continued the argument that decency and respect are
merely two factors in the mix that deserve some consideration. If so, the Court’s
opinion may suggest that these criteria are not viewpoint oriented simply
because Congress indicated that it did not desire to preclude any artist solely on
the basis of viewpoint. If this is the case, then Justice Scalia’s46 and Justice
40. See id. at 2176.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 2176.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 2182 (Scalia, J., concurring).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/1
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Souter’s47 replies, that Congress could hardly neutralize viewpoint
discriminatory criteria by declaring in the legislative history that it did not mean
to authorize censorship, are unanswerable.
2. The Impact of the Statute
If there was any doubt where the Court was headed, however, it proceeded
to assert that the mere consideration of decency and respect, as opposed to a
flat-out prohibition, is unlikely to exert a chilling effect on the speech of artists,
presumably because the threat is too indirect or diffuse.48 Both Justice Scalia49
and Justice Souter50 took the Court to task for apparently assuming that
consideration of a nonpreclusive factor will have no impact. As Justice Scalia
put it, “[T]he presence of the ‘tak[e] into consideration’ clause ‘cannot be
regarded as mere surplusage; it means something,’ . . . [a]nd the ‘something’ is
that the decisionmaker, all else being equal, will favor applications that display
decency and respect, and disfavor applications that do not.”51
This seems obvious unless it is assumed first that the decision maker will
ignore these criteria, and second that it is obvious to applicants that such will be
the case. That may be the practice that the NEA would pursue, however, it is
not an interpretation of the statute and its enforcement that the Court
consciously adopted. Rather, the Court seemed to assert that the criteria
simultaneously means “something” and “nothing.”
a. Decency and Respect Are Not Particularly Focused
The primary point that the Court seemed to make in this section of its
opinion is that the decency and respect criteria are neither intended to, nor will in
practice, discriminate against specific viewpoints. It reasoned that because
decency and respect are relatively vague terms that may mean different things to
different people, they do not preclude any “particular” viewpoint.52 From a
standpoint of promoting free discussion, it seems perverse to prefer a statutory
term that due to its vagueness discourages several points of view rather than just
one. The notion of vagueness as an antidote to viewpoint discrimination would
47. See id. at 2187 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 2176-77.
49. See id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. See id. at 2189-90 (Souter, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 2177.
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seem to stand the concept of vagueness on its head.
Perhaps the best response to this argument is that the term decency does
have a relatively clearly defined meaning. Justice Scalia, rarely far removed
from a dictionary, pointed out that “decency” is defined as “‘[c]onformity to
prevailing standards of propriety or modesty.’”53 Justice Souter turned instead
to an even more authoritative source, prior Supreme Court precedent for the
proposition that “‘the normal definition of ‘indecent’ . . . refers to
nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.’”54 Vagueness arguments
of the plaintiffs notwithstanding, Congress had a fairly good idea of what it
meant by decency, as do the NEA and artists applying for grants.
The Court seemed to dismiss concerns about viewpoint discrimination on the
ground that the criteria of decency and respect do not focus on “particular
views”55 nor do they result in “directed viewpoint discrimination.”56 The C urt
correctly suggested that indecent artwork could support either side of a
particular debate. For instance, different artists might paint a picture of Jesse
Helms or Karen Finley sexually abusing the Statue of Liberty to make
contrasting points about the respective threats they pose to American values.
The indecency and respect criteria could be considered content neutral with
respect to this debate, even though it is more likely that opponents of the
decency clause would use indecency to make their point than would its
proponents. The criteria, however, are anything but neutral with respect to
whether it is appropriate to use indecency as a means of artistic expression and
whether it is appropriate for artists to be disrespectful of the beliefs and values
of significant sectors of the public.
As both Justices Scalia57 and Souter58 ecognized, the statute would clearly
prefer decent and respectful art over that which is not. The sensibilities of a
Norman Rockwell or an Ansel Adams would presumably be preferred over
those of a Mapplethorpe, Serrano, or Finley. Most viewpoint-based criteria
could be rendered even more discriminatory by focusing them more narrowly.
For instance, a ban on indecency could be tightened into a ban on homoerotic
indecency or a ban on indecency in support of abortion. The fact that these are
even more egregious examples of viewpoint discrimination does not render the
53. Id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 483 (3d ed.
1992) (second definition)).
54. Id. at 2187 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978)).
55. Id. at 2177.
56. Id. at 2176.
57. See id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. See id. at 2188 (Souter, J., dissenting).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/1
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concept of indecency itself viewpoint neutral, however.
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b. A Facial Challenge
The majority next emphasized that because the case presented only an on-
the-face challenge to the legislation, “the vague exhortation to ‘take them into
consideration’ . . . seems unlikely . . . [to] introduce any greater element of
selectivity than the determination of ‘artistic excellence’ itself.”59 Never heless,
as Justice Souter observed, the additional selectivity introduced by the concepts
of decency and respect will inevitably be more viewpoint oriented than the
concept of artistic excellence.60 Th  majority seemed determined to ignore this
point.
The Court then explained that the NEA was vested with responsibilities such
as encouraging educational programs, to which the decency criterion would be
germane,61 and preserving our multicultural heritage, to which the respect
criterion would be relevant.62 No sooner did the majority make this point,
however, than it conceded that “[w]e recognize, of course, that reference to these
permissible applications would not alone be sufficient to sustain the statute
against respondents’ First Amendment challenge.”63 The Court presumably
made these points to bolster the argument that a facial challenge to the statute
was inappropriate, given that there seemed to be constitutional applications.
Nevertheless, the primary point that the Court seemed to draw from these
potential constitutional applications was that if the NEA legitimately can take
account of decency in some contexts without suppressing particular viewpoints,
then there is no reason why it cannot do so in other contexts as well.64 But if the
decency and respect criteria are acceptable in the educational context, it isn’t
because they are viewpoint neutral but rather because they are pertinent and
justifiable despite the fact that they are viewpoint discriminatory. As both
Justices Scalia65 and Souter66 ecognized, and as the majority refused to admit,
the justification, if any, for admittedly viewpoint-discriminatory criteria should
have been the central issue of the case.
59. Id. at 2177.
60. See id. at 2192 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 2177.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 2177-78.
65. See id. at 2183 (Scalia, J., concurring).
66. See id. at 2193 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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3. Application of the Rosenberger Case
The majority then turned its attention to Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of University of Virginia,67 pparently the most pertinent precedent. The
majority distinguished the Rosenberger facts from the facts in Finley. In
Rosenberger, the Court found unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when
the University created a limited public forum by subsidizing the printing costs of
student publications, except those presenting a religious perspective.68 In Finley,
however, according to the majority, the NEA art funding project was designed
not to “‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers’” but rather to
encourage excellence through a competitive process.69 The Court reasoned that
in a competitive process, unlike a public forum, judgments on whether to
subsidize will inevitably be based on content, at least in the form of artistic
excellence.70
Justice Scalia also distinguished Rosenberger, but solely on the basis that
the University had established a limited public forum, arguing that whether the
process was competitive or not was irrelevant.71
Justice Souter, on the other hand, maintained that Rosenberger controlled
and that it prohibited the NEA’s use of viewpoint-based criteria.72 He argued
that, like the student activity fund in Rosenberger, Congress had declared that
the NEA grant program was designed “to ‘support new ideas’ and ‘to help
create and sustain . . . a climate of encouraging freedom of thought,
imagination, and inquiry.’”73 As such, the NEA may not deny applications due
to the unpopularity of the viewpoint expressed.74 Justic  Souter argued that
Rosenberger effectively rejected the Finley majority’s attempt to distinguish
NEA funding on account of its competitive nature when it declared that “‘[t]he
government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among private speakers on
the economic fact of scarcity.’”75 Rather, even where funds are scarce, the
Government must base selection on viewpoint-neutral criteria.76 Justi e Souter
67. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
68. See id. at 834-36.
69. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835).
70. See id. at 2177-78.
71. See id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
72. See id. at 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(10), (7) (1994)).
74. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2192 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835).
76. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1 Bloom.doc 05/20/99   11:42 AM
14 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1
also argued that, contrary to Justice Scalia’s interpretation, Rosenberger did not
turn on the conclusion that the student fund was a public forum, and in any
event, the Court had established that viewpoint discrimination is impermissible
even in nonpublic forums.77
Rosenberger would seem to be the most pertinent precedent to the NEA
controversy. Nevertheless, it is hardly on all fours with Finley and thus requires
thoughtful consideration. Justice O’Connor’s reading of the case is defensible.
The majority’s primary distinction between the competitive grant process in
Finley and the broadly available fund in Rosenberger is factually accurate. In
contrast, Justice Souter’s argument is misleading when he suggests that
Rosenberger anticipated and disposed of the possibility of a competitive
subsidization process issue with its notation that “the government cannot justify
viewpoint discrimination among private speakers on the economic fact of
scarcity.”78 The Finley majority did not contend that scarcity leads to selectivity,
but rather that a competitive process inevitably leads to selectivity. Aside from
the fact that all resources—especially cash grants—are somewhat scarce, an
institution could parcel out scarce resources in relatively small amounts to all
applicants (as was presumably done in Rosenberger) or it could dispense them
on a first-come-first-served basis. By definition, however, a competitive process
will result in the denial of many, if not most, applications on the basis of some
criteria. Likewise, in a given year, the NEA could deny many applications and
decline to dispense all of the funds available simply because there were an
insufficient number of “artistically excellent” proposals. Consequently, Justice
Souter’s conclusion that “the Court’s ‘competition’ is merely a surrogate for
‘scarcity’” is simply incorrect.
A competitive process requires the use of selection criteria that are
unnecessary in a noncompetitive process. Thus, the majority explained that,
unlike the student fund in Rosenberger, the NEA relies on an inherently content-
based “excellence threshold” in evaluating applications.79 Justice Souter
recognized this but argued that Rosenberger requires the state to use only
viewpoint-neutral criteria, even in a competitive process.80 Artistic excellence,
though content based, would satisfy Justice Souter while viewpoint-oriented
criteria such as decency and respect would not. On its facts, however,
Rosenberger doesn’t go so far because, contrary to Justice Souter’s
77. See id. at 2192 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
79. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178.
80. See id. at 2192 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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interpretation, it did not address the problem of viewpoint neutrality in a
competitive selection process.
Explaining that the NEA funding process is competitive and that the
Rosenberger program wasn’t is a start, but to adequately distinguish
Rosenberger, the Court needed to explain why using a competitive process is
sufficient to legitimize viewpoint-based discrimination. The Court’s terse
explanation was that in the arts funding context “the Government does not
indiscriminately ‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.’”81
It certainly does not follow, however, that because the Government may
utilize content-based but viewpoint-neutral selection criteria in a competitive
process, it may in turn use viewpoint-based criteria as well. But the Court’s
holding does not appear to extend so far. Rather, the Court seemed to be taking
issue with Justice Souter’s conclusion that the primary point of the arts funding
program is to support and encourage debate, discourse, or diversity of ideas.
Instead, the Court seemed to suggest that the point of the program is to
encourage good art regardless of whether it leads to a public forum-like
environment. Thus, for the majority, diversity of viewpoint in NEA funded art
would seem to be more of a happy by-product of the program than its intended
goal.
Relying on the NEA Act itself, Justice Souter argued that encouraging
diversity of viewpoint is far more central to the NEA’s mission than the
majority seemed willing to concede.82 But assuming that the majority’s
conception of the NEA’s mission is accurate, it still failed to explain why
consideration of decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values is justifiable
in such a context. Had the Court truly believed that the criteria of decency and
respect were viewpoint neutral, it could have readily distinguished Rosenberger
on that basis alone. The fact that the Court labored mightily to distinguish
Rosenberger on other grounds suggests that it understood that section 954(d)
presented a serious viewpoint-discrimination issue.
Having disposed of Rosenberger, however, at least to its own satisfaction,
the Court did not suggest that in a competitive subsidy process the Government
can freely discriminate on the basis of viewpoint without limitation. To the
contrary, emphasizing that the challenge to section 954(d) was on its face rather
than as applied and that there were no allegations before the Court that any
particular grant had been denied on account of viewpoint discrimination, the
81. Id. at 2178 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834).
82. See id. at 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting)
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majority cited several precedents for the proposition that “even in the provision
of subsidies, the Government may not ‘ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous
ideas.’”83 The majority also noted that “a more pressing constitutional question
would arise if government funding resulted in the imposition of a
disproportionate burden calculated to drive ‘certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace.’”84 As a result, the majority indicated that if, in a given case, the
NEA applies the criteria in issue in a manner that appears intended to suppress
a viewpoint or at least has that effect, a serious First Amendment question will
exist. Therefore, the key to Finley may be that the case presented an on-the-face
challenge, leaving the Court’s standard viewpoint discrimination doctrine to be
applied with customary rigor upon a showing that a particular application was
denied because it was indecent or disrespectful.
4. Subsidization vs. Regulation and a Justification for Viewpoint
Discrimination
The majority ended section II-A of its opinion by upholding the
constitutionality of the challenged provision on its face. At that point, one might
assume that the opinion is about to end, given that the majority purported to
have resolved the issue presented. The majority, however, added a short but
significant paragraph headed II-B that seems to qualify, perhaps significantly,
much of what was said in the preceding paragraph. After having just suggested
that an actual viewpoint-based denial would raise serious First Amendment
concerns, the majority observed that “although the First Amendment certainly
has application in the subsidy context, we note that the Government may
allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible
were direct regulation of speech . . . at stake.”85 Citing Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington,86 Rust v. Sullivan,87 and Maher v. Roe,88 the
majority explained that the Government has wide discretion to choose spending
priorities or to engage in selective funding without discriminating on the basis of
viewpoint.89 In the midst of this paragraph, the majority pointed out that
83. Id. at 2178 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).
84. Id. at 2178-79 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
85. Id. at 2179.
86. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
87. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
88. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
89. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179.
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“Congress modified the declaration of purpose in the NEA’s enabling act to
provide that arts funding should ‘contribute to public support and confidence in
the use of taxpayer funds.’”90 Presumably, the majority was suggesting that
contributing to public support and confidence through the consideration of
decency and respect is a legitimate choice of priorities, analogous to the decision
in Regan to subsidize lobbying only by veterans groups91 through a tax
exemption or the decision in Rust to subsidize preconceptional but not abortion
counseling.92 If so, then effectuating this congressional choice of priorities by
denying an application on the grounds of indecency could hardly violate
freedom of speech any more than denying a grant pursuant to the program in
Rust because the grantee intended to engage in abortion counseling. Apparently,
section II-B attempts at least to acknowledge the existence of relevant
unconstitutional conditions doctrine precedent such as Regan, Rust, and Maher
without actually engaging in detailed analysis of the issues from that
perspective.
Arguably, this ambiguous paragraph represents the only point in the
majority’s opinion that even comes close to addressing the central issue raised
by the case—that is, when Congress chooses to subsidize art, may it disfavor
some proposals (the indecent and the disrespectful) either to protect the public
from the indignity of having its tax dollars sponsor work that many consider
deeply offensive or to at least prevent the ensuing controversy from undermining
the program. Notably absent from the majority’s opinion in Finley is any
consideration of why Congress might have enacted section 954(d) and whether
such reasons are capable of justifying viewpoint-discriminatory criteria.93 In this
paragraph, the majority briefly flirted with the question of justification but failed
to confront it.
By way of contrast, the issues that the Court slid past obliquely in section II-
B are at the very core of Justice Scalia’s opinion. From his perspective, the
Government’s all but unconstrained freedom to set its priorities and choose what
speech to subsidize, even if based on viewpoint, is more than sufficient to
resolve the case in its favor.94
Justice Souter reached the opposite conclusion, noting that both Regan and
Rust held that the selective-funding programs in issue were not viewpoint
90. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(5) (1994)).
91. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 550-51.
92. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 179.
93. See infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
94. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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discriminatory, and each had indicated that the programs would likely have been
unconstitutional had they been viewpoint discriminatory.95 This led him to
conclude that these cases were off point and that Rosenberger, prohibiting
viewpoint selective subsidization, was the case that really mattered.96
Section II-B of the majority’s opinion has a tacked-on quality, suggesting
that it was the product of or an offering to one or more Justices who did not
fully agree with the approach in II-A, but who were willing to join in the opinion
if the majority included some language suggesting, somewhat along the lines of
the Scalia concurrence, that Congress has significantly greater discretion to
engage in content and perhaps even viewpoint-based selectivity in a
subsidization (as opposed to a regulation) context. This suggests that in future
cases involving either NEA funding or other subsidization programs, at least
some of the Justices who joined the Finley majority opinion may build on the
section II-B qualification and possibly de-emphasize the language to the
contrary in the preceding paragraph. From the standpoint of offering a forthright
and coherent opinion in Finley, however, the Court should have directly
confronted the issue raised but slighted in section II-B. Nevertheless, the Court
was probably unable to build a majority to do so.
5. Vagueness
The final two paragraphs of the majority’s opinion in section III addressed
the issue of vagueness because the district court and court of appeals both found
section 954(d)(1) unconstitutionally vague. The majority conceded that the
terms in question are perhaps too opaque for a criminal statute. It concluded,
however, that the terms possessed sufficient clarity for the subsidization context
because artists were unlikely to be substantially chilled. The majority also
asserted that some degree of generality is inevitable in a competitive program
promoting excellence.97 It noted that several other federal grant programs would
be in jeopardy if the NEA criteria were unconstitutionally vague.98
As with the issue of content discrimination, Justice Scalia concluded that the
vagueness doctrine had no application whatsoever to subsidization as opposed
to regulation.99 Justice Souter rejected the vagueness challenge in a footnote,
95. See id. at 2190-91 (Souter, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting).
97. See id. at 2179-80.
98. See id. at 2180.
99. See id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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agreeing with the majority that a degree of imprecision is unavoidable in the
competitive grant context.100
Arguably, the vagueness issue was not as easy as the Supreme Court
suggested. Both the district court and the court of appeals made credible
arguments for vagueness. The fact that no member of the Supreme Court was
troubled about vagueness suggests that they were indeed concerned with a
precedent that might cut deeply into less controversial grant programs. All
things considered, however, the majority’s treatment of vagueness would be
fairly unremarkable but for the fact that it had suggested earlier in its opinion
that the terms decency and respect could scarcely be viewpoint discriminatory
given that no two people could agree on what they meant.101 In oth r words, the
criteria were too vague to be unconstitutionally discriminatory but not too vague
to be unconstitutionally vague.
6. Summary
In summary, the majority in Finley held that section 954(d)(1) is not
viewpoint discriminatory, at least to an unconstitutional degree, because the
criteria are mere factors rather than flat prohibitions. That is, Congress
purported not to discriminate against point of view because the criteria are too
vague to single out a particular viewpoint. Moreover, content-based criteria are
inevitable in a competitive grant process. Such criteria are not unconstitutional
on their face because they have obviously valid applications. The criteria might
be unconstitutional if they were used to discriminate against particular points of
view in an individual case. Then again, the Government has far more room to
rely on content in a subsidization as opposed to a regulation case. Finally, the
criteria are not vague.
This summary, however, makes the opinion seem more coherent than it is. In
fact, the majority’s opinion jumps from one argument to the next without any
sense of logic or closure. It is self-contradictory from paragraph to paragraph
and often from one sentence to the next. It labors to obscure the significant
issues raised by the case. Finally, it appears to be largely oblivious to the
forceful criticisms leveled at it by the concurrence and dissent.
B. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence
100. See id. at 2196 n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
101. See id. at 2176-77.
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Much of Justice Scalia’s concurrence is a point by point response to the
majority opinion. To the extent I have noted these arguments above, I will not
repeat them here in any detail.
In the first section of the concurrence, Justice Scalia establishes beyond
argument that the obligation to take the disputed criteria “into consideration”
means that they should have some substantive effect in the decision-making
process with respect to individual applications.102 Th s point was equally made
by Justice Souter103 and both lower court opinions.104 Justice Scalia then pointed
out that the decency and respect criteria need not be conclusive to have the type
of impact that implicates freedom of speech.105 This seems obvious despite the
majority’s attempts to obscure the matter. Then, as set forth above,106 Justice
Scalia argued that the terms decency and respect, as used in the legislation and
as commonly understood, are viewpoint discriminatory.107 O ce again, Justice
Scalia clearly got the best of this dispute with the majority.
The primary thrust of Justice Scalia’s concurrence, however, is that
Congress has every right to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in a subsidy
program because it is unlikely to have a coercive effect.108 Justic  Scalia
instructed the Court, “The Statute Means What It Says.”109 The majority might
well have replied, “So Does the Precedent.” Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia
grappled with the central issues in the case and built a clear and logical
argument. But in order to treat viewpoint discrimination as a nonissue in the
subsidization context, however, he had to disregard several cases in which the
Court assumed that First Amendment principles do apply, at least to some
extent, to Government subsidies.110
102. See id. at 2180-81 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. See id. at 2188 (Souter, J., dissenting).
104. See Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d. 671, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1996); Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457,
1470-71 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
105. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. See supra Part III.A.
107. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 2183-84 (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring) (title of section I of his opinion).
110. First and foremost, in Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987), the
Court invalidated a state statute that excluded certain magazines and journals from receiving a tax
exemption. In order to support his argument in Finley that subsidies, whether direct or by exemption, are
generally not sufficiently coercive to violate the First Amendment, Justice Scalia resorted to citing his own
dissenting opinion in Arkansas Writers’ Project. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2183 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Arkansas Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Curiously enough, the
majority cited other language in Scalia’s Arkansas Writers’ Project di sent for the proposition that
discriminatory subsidies could violate freedom of speech. See id. at 2178 (quoting Arkansas Writers’
Project, 481 U.S. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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Justice Scalia cited Rust v. Sullivan for the proposition that the Government
can “‘selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities . . . without at
the same time funding an alternate program.’”111 He failed to acknowledge,
however, that Rust suggested that favoring a particular viewpoint through
subsidization might not be acceptable in certain spheres of discourse in which
free speech values predominate, such as a public forum or a public university.112
Thus, if Rust supports the constitutionality of the NEA criteria, there should at
least be some explanation as to why public arts funding should not be included
in this “sphere of discourse” exception.
Justice Scalia rejected as mistaken the respondent’s attempt to distinguish
Rosenberger as a case in which the Government paid someone else to propagate
its own message, instead of expending funds to encourage diverse viewpoints
from private speakers.113 Justice Scalia failed to acknowledge, however, that
this was not merely the respondent’s creative reading of Rosenberger, but rather
the Rosenberger Court’s explicit interpretation of Rust.114 In explaining why
such a distinction should not make a difference either as a matter of
constitutional law or common sense, Justice Scalia assumed that if the
Government decides to promulgate a message, it can either do so directly, hire
others to promulgate it, or subsidize others to promulgate it.115 Assuming that
this is true, it seems to offer only strained characterizations of the NEA arts
funding program. To Justice Scalia, the Congress, through the NEA, is
spending money to promulgate excellent art that is neither indecent nor
disrespectful of diverse beliefs and values. In contrast, to Justice Souter,
Congress is spending funds to encourage a wide range of artistic creativity
wholly apart from its viewpoint, as long as what is subsidized is excellent,
decent, and respectful. Thus, while Justice Scalia believed that the conditions
(decency and respect) define the program and are the messages that the
Government desires to transmit, as in Rust, Justice Souter believed that these
conditions subtract from an otherwise diverse marketplace of ideas created by
the Government, as in Rosenberger. Arguably, neither characterization fully
captures the arts funding program. Justice Souter, however, seems closer to the
reality than does Justice Scalia.
Ultimately, Justice Scalia distinguished Rosenberger as a case in which the
111. Id. at 2183 (Scalia, J. concurring) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
112. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
113. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
114. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995).
115. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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state established a limited public forum.116This is a strained reading of the case.
But if Scalia is correct, he failed to explain why the subsidization program in
Rosenberger was a public forum and the NEA program was not. Moreover, he
failed to respond to Justice Souter’s argument that forum type should not make
a difference because, under the Court’s precedents, regulation of nonpublic
forums must be viewpoint neutral.117
Justice Scalia summarized his position by explaining, “I regard the
distinction between ‘abridging’ speech and funding it as a fundamental divide,
on this side of which the First Amendment is inapplicable.”118 Unlike the
majority opinion, Justice Scalia’s approach is clear and as a matter of first
impression intuitively sensible. The obvious drawback, however, is that he can
derive this principle only by disregarding or mischaracterizing much of the
relevant precedent.
C. Justice Souter’s Dissent
Only Justice Souter dissented. As with Justice Scalia’s opinion, much of
Justice Souter’s dissent offers specific counterarguments to the majority opinion
which have been discussed above and which will not be restated in any detail.
Justice Souter began by emphasizing the bedrock principle that the First
Amendment prohibits viewpoint discrimination.119 He then concluded that both
the text and history of section 954(d) show that it was intended to, and does in
fact, disfavor some speech because of its message.120 Expounding on that
conclusion, he argued that it is irrelevant from a First Amendment perspective
whether the forbidden criteria are total prohibitions or merely factors in the
decision-making process.121
Unlike the majority or Justice Scalia, Justice Souter attempted to develop
carefully the distinctions between the Government as speaker or buyer, the
Government as regulator (as suggested by Rust and Rosenberger), and the
Government as patron (as suggested by the Solicitor General).122 Noting that the
Government conceded that it was acting as neither speaker nor buyer through
the NEA program, Justice Souter found that Rosenberger rather than Rust was
116. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178 (majority opinion)).
117. See id. at 2192 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. See id. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 2188-90 (Souter, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 2189-90 (Souter, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 2190-91 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the most pertinent precedent.123 He hen concluded that consideration of decency
and respect by the NEA is impermissible viewpoint discrimination in a program
subsidizing private speech, just as the prohibition of funding publications with a
religious perspective was in Rosenberger.124 As noted above, Justice Souter
rejected the majority’s attempt to distinguish NEA funding from Rosenberger
as a competitive selection process125 as well as Justice Scalia’s attempt to
distinguish it as a nonpublic forum.126
Justice Souter explicitly addressed the Government’s argument that the
Court should recognize a new analytical category for Government patronage,
but he rejected it on the ground that the Government failed to justify the need for
such a creation.127 Perhaps such a new characterization most accurately
describes what is at stake. None of the existing characterizations quite capture
the NEA funding program. The Government is not speaking. It is not buying
art. It is not hiring private parties to propagate its message. It is not regulating
speech. It is not simply creating a public forum to encourage discourse
(although this comes closer than the alternatives). Rather, it is encouraging
artistic expression within a framework of excellence, decency, and respect for
diverse beliefs and values. It is not simply sponsoring a message or viewpoint as
Justice Scalia would have it, nor is it creating an unconstrained public forum as
Justice Souter suggests. It is doing something in between. The Government’s
characterization of the NEA as patron may not be perfect, but it comes closer to
capturing the essence of the program than any of the competing
characterizations.128
Justice Souter ended his opinion with a lengthy response to the majority’s
distinction between an as-applied invalidation and an on-the-face challenge of
section 945(d)(1).129 He maintained that the contexts in which decency and
123. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
124. See id. at 2191-92 (Souter, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 2192 n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 2192 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 2192-93 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128. Assuming the creation of a new analytical category might be helpful, at least as a descriptive
matter, there remains the question of what to do with it. That is, what standard of review should apply
when the Government acts as patron? The Government contended that a rational basis test should apply.
Justice Souter dismissed this as too lenient in a case involving viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 2193.
The concluding Part of this Article argues that patronage is different and that the Government should be
permitted to condition its grants of patronage, at least in the arts, on an agreement to respect certain widely
shared public sensibilities. The majority hinted at this in section II-B of its opinion, and Justice Souter
briefly considered and rejected it in his dissent. Nevertheless, neither gave this argument the full
consideration that it deserved.
129. See id. at 2193-96 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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respect could be constitutionally taken into consideration are quite limited; thus
the statute is substantially overbroad and ripe for facial challenge.130 Moreover,
he found it likely that section 954(d) will cause artists to modify their work to
obtain grants or to forego the grant-making process, thus chilling artistic
expression either way.131 Justice Souter’s analysis of the appropriateness of a
full facial challenge under the circumstances is more consistent with the
precedent than the majority’s half-hearted suggestions to the contrary.
Justice Souter’s opinion is the most satisfying of the three. Unlike the
majority, he faced the issue squarely. Unlike Justice Scalia, he attempted to
address and apply relevant precedent. His analysis is largely consistent with
established doctrine. Yet, as noted above, Justice Souter attempted to cram the
factual situation into doctrinal characterizations that fail to capture the
dynamics of the controversy. Justice Souter’s failure to convince even one other
member of the Court to concur in his careful, craftsmanlike analysis suggests
that this case offered something else that his doctrinally predictable approach
failed to address.
IV. THE DYNAMICS OF THE FINLEY CASE
In Finley, the Court addressed a legal issue that had been debated and
analyzed in the law reviews for the better part of a decade. The Court benefited
from a court of appeals decision with a strong dissent that presented the basic
arguments with clarity. The Court received thorough briefs from many leading
lawyers and law professors. In short, the Court had sufficient resources
available to resolve the issue persuasively one way or the other. The Court
decided the case, of course, but with an extraordinarily muddled opinion. Justice
Scalia’s concurrence was far more precise analytically but was too extreme and
too disrespectful of precedent to attract more than Justice Thomas’s vote.
Justice Souter’s dissent was largely consistent with current doctrine and under
other circumstances might have attracted a majority of the Court. Yet, in Finley,
it failed to garner another vote. Obviously, this requires explanation or at least
invites speculation.
The most obvious explanation of Finley is that the Court simply decided to
validate the political compromise that Congress and the NEA worked out in
order to defuse the controversy swirling around the agency since 1989. Certain
130. See id. at 2194-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 2195 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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factions in Congress largely created the NEA funding controversy in response to
the Mapplethorpe and Serrano grants, forcing Congress to cope with it in some
politically feasible manner.132 Few members of Congress would relish
explaining to constituents why they voted against decency in arts funding.
Following the report of the Independent Commission, Congress added
section 954(d)(1) to stress artistic excellence, but with decency and respect for
diverse beliefs and values taken into consideration. This provided Congress with
political cover. Moreover, almost from the outset, the Chairperson of the NEA
effectively read the decency clause out of the legislation by determining that he
could meet his obligations under the statute by ensuring that membership on the
panels comprised people of diverse beliefs and values.133 During oral argument
in Finley, Justice Scalia noted that such efforts might address the obligation to
respect diversity, but he wondered whether the Chairperson also went out of his
way to appoint decent people to the panels to fulfill the decency requirement.134
As construed by the Chairperson, however, the decency and respect clauses, as
such, posed little realistic threat to the arts community. But it became apparent
that the NEA had internalized the lessons of the Mapplethorpe and Serrano
controversies and had decided to attempt to steer clear of obviously
controversial grants to the extent possible in order to avoid reigniting the
controversy.135 Consequently, the authority to award grants to individual
performing artists such as Karen Finley recently has been cut back
substantially.136 Also, attempts to defund or eliminate the NEA have been
132. See generally John E. Frohnmayer, Giving Offense, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993); Garvey,
supra note 1, at 190-97.
133. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2173-74.
134. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *7, Finley (No. 97-371), available in
1998 WL 156955 (Mar. 31, 1998) (Oral Argument of Seth P. Waxman on Behalf of the Petitioners).
135. Anne-Imelda Radice, the Chairperson of the NEA who succeeded John Frohnmayer after he was
forced to resign in 1992, made it clear that she would be sensitive to taxpayer sensibilities in considering
grant applications. See Kim Masters, Acting Arts Chief Vows to Keep It Clean; House Testimony by
Anne-Imelda Radice Seen Reversing Frohnmayer, WASH. POST, May 6, 1992, at A1.
Quite recently, the Chairperson of the NEA canceled a grant to fund the printing of a children’s book
entitled The Story of Colors written by a Mexican guerrilla leader. See Julia Preston, N.E.A. Couldn’t
Tell a Book by Its Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at A1. The book refers to characters smoking pipes
and making love and includes an illustration of “a reclining naked woman in a sexual embrace with a
figure that appears to be a male God.” Id at A8. The Chairperson explained that the grant was rescinded
not because of the contents of the book but rather out of concern that the funds would be used to support
guerrilla activity. See id.
From the newspaper description, it would not seem that the book would be considered indecent or
disrespectful of the diverse beliefs and values of the American public although it might be deemed
inappropriate for young children.
136. See Act of Nov. 14, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-83, § 329, 111 Stat. 1543, 1600 (making
appropriations for Department of Interior and related agencies for fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1998).
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beaten back politically, although its budget has been decreased significantly.137
Essentially, before the Court decided Finley, the political process had worked
out a rough compromise that gave opponents of the NEA some things to crow
about, minimized the actual First Amendment threat, and protected the NEA
against future political assault.
While the Court may have validated this political compromise, it does not
deserve credit for saving the NEA as such. The NEA apparently had weathered
the political storm, and it is unlikely that a judicial invalidation of the decency
and respect clause would have led to a serious assault on its continued existence,
especially considering the fact that the agency had been enjoined from enforcing
section 954(d)(1) almost since its enactment. Had the Court invalidated the
decency and respect criteria, Congress might have proposed new constraints on
the NEA’s discretion which probably would have led to further litigation. But
even in the absence of any congressional limitation, the NEA would be unlikely
to deliberately approve grants that might plunge it back into the political turmoil
from which it had only recently escaped.
The easiest and quite possibly the most accurate explanation of the Finley
opinion is that a majority of the Court examined the existing state of affairs,
concluded that it had worked relatively effectively, and decided to leave well
enough alone. The majority opinion then seems to be an attempt to preserve the
status quo and minimize any long-term damage to First Amendment doctrine.
This interpretation fits nicely with the analysis set forth in two recent
forewords to the Harvard Law Review’s Supreme Court Note. In an article
entitled Law as Equilibrium, Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey
argued that the Court generally is and should be hesitant to interfere with states
of equilibrium achieved on controversial issues by competing political
institutions.138 The Finley decision appears to exemplify such strategic behavior.
The following year, Professor Cass Sunstein contributed a foreword entitled
Leaving Things Undecided139 in which he argued that when the Court agrees on
a result but finds it difficult to agree on a satisfying legal rationale, it often
writes opinions which he refers to as “incompletely theorized agreements.”140
That is, the Court decides the case but leaves to subsequent Courts the task of
137. See Katharine Q. Seelye, For Election Year, House Approves Arts Financing, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 1998, at A1.
138. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).
139. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
140. Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).
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explaining how the decision fits into the existing doctrinal and theoretical
frameworks.141 The Court generally must say something, though what it says
may be incomplete, confusing, and internally inconsistent.142 Professor Sunstein
used Romer v. Evans143 as a prime example of such an opinion.144 Had he
written his foreword two years later, NEA v. Finley would have illustrated his
thesis just as nicely. Finley is an example of “decisional minimalism” to use
another of his characterizations,145 n that it assiduously avoids bold doctrinal or
theoretical pronouncements. Similarly, like many minimalistic opinions, its
internal contradictions suggest that it was the product of severe disagreement
within the Court regarding the appropriate rationale. In Finley, where the Court
found itself probably facing some internal disagreement as well as wrestling
with a politically controversial issue already largely resolved by other branches
of the Government, the Court did what Professor Sunstein argued that it would
and should do—it resolved the case with a narrow and shallow opinion, leaving
larger doctrinal and theoretical issues undecided.
V. THE DOCTRINAL IMPACT OF FINLEY
The Court in Finley may well have intended to decide a politically
troublesome case in a way that would have been difficult to justify under
existing doctrine while minimizing damage to that doctrine. The Court may have
hoped that its opinion was sufficiently muddled so as to be of little use in the
future, or it may have hoped to successfully limit its holding to the facts in
subsequent litigation. Once the Court releases an opinion, however, it cannot
control how it will be used by Justices in future cases, much less how lower
federal and state courts will use it. Certainly, some of the language in Finley, if
taken seriously, can cause analytical confusion in the future, particularly in two
areas: viewpoint discrimination and unconstitutional conditions.
A. Viewpoint Discrimination
The prohibition against viewpoint discrimination in the arts context is now
one of the most central tenets in the Court’s freedom of speech jurisprudence
141. See id. at 21-25.
142. See id.
143. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
144. See Sunstein, supra note 139, at 57-70.
145. Id. at 4.
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over the past two decades.146 Stating the rule is easier than applying it, however.
Commentators have faulted the Court for failing to define adequately the
concept of viewpoint discrimination or even to distinguish it sufficiently from
content discrimination, which though troublesome, is more permissible.147 Not
surprisingly, the Justices have not always agreed when classifying a particular
regulation as viewpoint or content discriminatory.148
Finley should add to the confusion. The Court seemed to deny that section
954(d)(1) was viewpoint discriminatory, at least in any sharp and particular
sense. It based this to a large degree on excerpts from the legislative history
indicating that Congress did not intend to preclude any specific viewpoint, as
well as on its own conclusion that the decency and respect criteria are too vague
to prohibit any particular point of view.149The Court seemingly treated decency
and respect as limitations on mode or style of speech rather than point of view
or perspective, although it did not explicitly make this claim. It also seemed to
suggest that singling out a particular viewpoint is essential to the success of an
on-the-face as opposed to an as-applied challenge.150
None of this seems sensible or even consistent with existing precedent.
Considering that precedent clearly has established viewpoint discrimination as
one of the primary villains under the First Amendment, legislators who intend to
burden viewpoints will likely proclaim the opposite. If a law appears to be
viewpoint discriminatory, self-serving legislative disclaimers offer little more
than an attempt to persuade the Court that the words do not mean what they
say.
The Court’s emphasis on the vagueness of the criteria seems to be used to
bolster its argument that Congress neither intended to nor did in fact single out
any specific viewpoint, such as “capitalism leads to inequality” or “affirmative
action is a form of racism.” Thus, indecent art could further either side of these
or any other debates. As such, indecency or lack of respect is more of a style or
146. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2185-86 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (compiling cases).
147. See DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 28 (1998); Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from
Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 700 (1996); Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 110 (1996); Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment
Neutrality: R.A.V. v St. Paul, Rust v Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992
SUP. CT. REV. 70; Sabrin, supra note 36, at 1210; Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—
Comment: Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 105 (1998).
148. Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-93 (1992) (Scalia, J.), with id. at 419-
21 (Stevens, J., concurring). Compare Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
830-32 (1996) (Kennedy, J.), with id. at 894-97 (Souter, J., dissenting).
149. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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mode of argument than a viewpoint or perspective. Although there is a certain
amount of truth in this argument, it misses another truth: the criteria of decency
and respect essentially embody the viewpoint that it is inappropriate to be
indecent and disrespectful.
The Court confronted a somewhat similar dispute over the meaning of
viewpoint discrimination in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,151 perhaps the Court’s
leading recent viewpoint discrimination case. The Court resolved that case
contrary to the way it resolved Finley. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens
argued that the criminalization of fighting words using race or religion was
viewpoint neutral because either side of a debate could use them.152 The
majority in that case rejected this approach, however, explaining that, as
compared to someone who chose not to rely on racially based fighting words,
the person who did was disadvantaged on the basis of viewpoint.153 Likewise, in
Rosenberger, Justice Souter argued in his dissent that the prohibition against
subsidizing religious perspectives was not viewpoint discriminatory because it
would apply to all religion-oriented advocacy, including advocacy by atheists
and agnostics.154 The majority in that case disagreed, however, pointing out that
the person who wished to discuss an issue from a religious perspective would be
disadvantaged as compared to the person who wanted to discuss it from a
nonreligious perspective.155 Thus, prior to Finley, the state clearly did not need
to explicitly single out a specific or narrow point of view in order to commit
viewpoint discrimination. Focusing on one category, approach, or perspective
that was itself defined by viewpoint or message was more than sufficient, even
though it could encompass many disparate subviewpoints or counterarguments.
To the extent that the Court suggested that decency and respect are best
considered modes or styles of speech with no particular message or viewpoint,
the Finley opinion also seems inconsistent with both the common understanding
of the terms and the precedent. Justices Scalia and Souter illustrated that
decency and respect are not simply content-hollow terms but do indeed have
well-understood meanings that encompass particular perspectives.156 Moreover,
to treat decency and respect as nothing more than styles of speech seems
151. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
152. See id. at 424-25 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. See id. at 391-92.
154. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 895-96 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
155. See id. at 831-32.
156. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent with well-established precedents such as Cohen v. California157 and
Texas v. Johnson.158 In Cohen, the Court confronted the question of whether the
state could prohibit displaying the word “fuck” under an offensive conduct
statute.159 In an oft-quoted opinion written by Justice Harlan, the Court
reasoned that such offensive language was not simply a regrettable style of
expression but carried both communicative and emotive impact.160 Lik wise, in
Johnson, Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent that the state statute
criminalizing desecration of a flag as applied to the burning of an American flag
in protest did not single out a message, but merely prohibited one means of
communication that the Chief Justice compared to an inarticulate grunt.161 The
majority rejected this interpretation, however, holding that the statute was
clearly viewpoint discriminatory.162 Thus, if Finley suggests that the decency
and respect criteria of section 954(d)(1) simply focus on content empty modes
of communication, then it conflicts with well-regarded precedent.
Although disingenuous and inconsistent with a great deal of well-established
doctrine, there is every reason to believe that the Finley Court’s treatment of the
viewpoint discrimination issue does not signal a significant change of direction
by the Court. At the outset, Finley may present a very limited threat to the
current jurisprudence of viewpoint discrimination simply because the reasoning
of the case is so obscure. The Court seemed to believe that viewpoint
discrimination did not present a major problem in the case but it never clearly
explained why. By leaving the reader to wonder what the Court meant,
subsequent courts will have the opportunity to reject troublesome interpretations
of the opinions as misunderstandings or overreactions.
The Court seemed to hedge its discussion of viewpoint discrimination by
limiting its consideration to an on-the-face challenge. It suggested that it would
be far more troubled if an applicant could actually demonstrate that the section
954(d)(1) criteria had been applied in a viewpoint discriminatory manner.
Indeed, the overwhelming number of viewpoint discrimination cases involve as-
applied challenges. Finley may simply mean that viewpoint discrimination can
only be established in an on-the-face challenge by demonstrating that the
regulation does and was intended to single out a very specific point of view.
157. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
158. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
159. See 403 U.S. at 16.
160. See id. at 25-26.
161. See 491 U.S. at 431-32 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 411-12.
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Although this may not make much sense, it may not do much harm either.
Finally, Finley’s discussion of viewpoint discrimination arose in the context
of subsidized speech rather than regulation. A fair amount of precedent suggests
that this should not matter,163 but the Finley majority seemed to suggest
otherwise. As the final Part of this Article will clarify, perhaps the lesson of
Finley should be that the state may engage in some viewpoint discrimination in
subsidy programs that would not be permissible elsewhere.
163. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; infra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
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B. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The other major doctrinal area implicated by Finley is the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. This doctrine, broadly construed, states that the
Government may not require a person to relinquish a constitutional right in
order to receive a Government benefit and vice versa.164 The Court has applied
the doctrine with great inconsistency and confusion, and it is widely considered
one of the most difficult areas in all of constitutional law.165
Section 954(d) certainly could be analyzed pursuant to the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. The rhetoric of unconstitutional conditions, however, was
not an important part of the Finley case and its history. Although the district
court invalidated section 954(d)(1) primarily on vagueness grounds, it noted that
the record was insufficiently developed to warrant summary judgment on the
unconstitutional conditions theory.166 The court of appeals hardly addressed the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, noting that it had not been properly
presented.167 The respondent addressed the doctrine very briefly in its brief to
the Supreme Court, but it clearly was not the primary focus of its argument.168
The Court itself addressed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine but rather
obliquely.
The Court’s precedents, particularly Rosenberger, which indicate that
viewpoint discrimination in a subsidy program is generally unconstitutional,
largely overshadow the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the arts funding
context because they provide a far less complicated challenge.169
In FCC v. League of Women Voters,170 the Court ruled that the state could
not require public television stations to refrain from editorializing in exchange
164. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
165. See generally FARBER, supra note 147, at 203; Sullivan, supra note 164; Cass R. Sunstein,
Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).
166. See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1472 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
167. See Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671, 674 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
168. See Respondents’ Brief at *48-*49, NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (No. 97-371),
available in 1998 WL 47281 (Feb. 6, 1998).
169. During the course of oral argument, one of the Justices suggested to David Cole, counsel for
respondents, that his entire case rested on Rosenberger. See United States Supreme Court Official
Transcript at *52, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 15955 (Mar. 31, 1998). He denied that
this was the case, citing Lamb’s Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384
(1993), and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985), both of which
are viewpoint discrimination precedents.
170. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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for federal funding, especially considering that these subsidies constituted only a
small portion of the stations’ revenues.171 Conversely, in Regan v. Taxation
with Representation,172 the Court allowed the state to condition tax exemptions
granted to organizations on an agreement not to use tax exempt funds to lobby
because the organizations could set up separate structures for lobbying with
non-tax exempt funds.173 Thus, a requirement to refrain from exercising a
constitutional right as a condition for receiving a Government subsidy is
especially vulnerable to challenge if the condition extends to funds or conduct
beyond the subsidy itself.
Rust v. Sullivan174 added a new wrinkle to the analysis. There, the Court
considered a federal regulation requiring recipients of a federal subsidy for
family planning projects to agree not to discuss abortion as an option or engage
in abortion referral.175 The Court upheld the regulation on the ground that it was
not an unconstitutional condition, but simply the definition of the program’s
scope.176 In other words, the state has the right to subsidize one type of activity
(preconception family planning counseling) rather than another (postconception
counseling considering abortion). Further, to protect the integrity of the
program, it may condition the receipt of the funds on an agreement to use them
for the former purpose but not the latter. An obvious difficulty with this
approach, as commentators have pointed out, is that it places few constraints on
the Government’s ability to skew public debate through its initial decisions as to
funding priorities and program definition.177 The Rust Court did place some
limit on the discretion of the state in this regard by declaring in dicta that the
state’s ability to limit speech through conditional spending would be far more
constrained in areas traditionally dedicated to freedom of speech such as public
forums and public universities.178 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia179 presented such a case, and the Court invalidated as
viewpoint discriminatory a rule that prohibited the University from paying the
printing costs of a student publication that “primarily promotes or manifests a
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”180
171. See id. at 370-73.
172. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
173. See id. at 550.
174. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
175. See id. at 179.
176. See id. at 193-94.
177. See, e.g., Redish & Kessler, supra note 36, at 576.
178. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
179. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
180. Id. at 822-23.
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To place the Finley challenge to section 954(d)(1) in an unconstitutional
conditions framework, the Government argued that the criteria of decency and
respect simply defined the scope of the program as in Rust and did not interfere
with the artist’s ability to create indecent and disrespectful art with private
funds.181 In response, the challengers argued that publicly funded art was an
example of an institution dedicated to free speech similar to the public forum
and the public university mentioned in Rosenberger. As such, the state could no
more place viewpoint-based restrictions on NEA grants than could the
University on its subsidies in Rosenberger.182 Moreover, NEA grants have an
impact on art produced by private funds because, by law, the grants can only
subsidize fifty percent of the project’s cost. Also, the grants play an important
role in attracting private support to artists and institutions.183
Several leading commentators have developed extensive theoretical
frameworks for analyzing unconstitutional conditions issues.184 A  g nerally
the case, however, the Court has shown no interest in them. The Court is more
than content to build on its precedents incrementally, however confused they
may be.
Essentially, the Court put an additional qualification on the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine as it had developed from League of Women Voters and
Regan to Rust. The challengers hoped to avoid Rust and ride Rosenberger to
the victory circle. The Court foiled the plan, however, by distinguishing
Rosenberger as a case of a viewpoint-based condition on an otherwise widely
available subsidy; NEA grants, conversely, are competitive in nature and as
such must be judged by criteria that to some extent will be content oriented.185
Thus, Rosenberger might control a widely available, first-come-first-served arts
funding program, but not a selective program based on artistic excellence. But
even if the state may rely on relatively viewpoint-neutral criteria (such as artistic
excellence in a competitive grant process), it may not necessarily rely on
obviously more viewpoint-based considerations (such as decency and respect).
181. See Petitioner’s Brief at *37-*40, NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (No. 97-371),
available in 1998 WL 11935 (Jan. 9, 1998).
182. See Respondent’s Brief at *30-*33, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 47281.
183. See id. at *37-*38.
184. See Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer,
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293
(1984); Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104
HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991); Sullivan, supra note 164.
185. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/1
p1 Bloom.doc 05/20/99   11:42 AM
1999] NEA V. FINLEY 35
Nevertheless, the majority was not inclined to address that response.
Under the majority’s approach, an unconstitutional conditions analysis will
not carry the day in a dispute regarding a competitive process. As with
viewpoint discrimination, however, the majority limited its analysis to the
context of an on-the-face challenge.186 The majority cautioned that the case
would present a different problem if the NEA denied a specific grant based on
its viewpoint. Perhaps, then, the competitive-process exception evaporates in as-
applied challenges. Yet immediately after suggesting this distinction, the
majority cited Rust v. Sullivan and Maher v. Roe for the proposition that the
Government can selectively fund whatever it chooses without obligation to
underwrite alternative approaches or points of view.187 This suggests that Rust
may have seriously undermined much of the existing unconstitutional conditions
precedent, Rosenberger notwithstanding.
The majority did not necessarily disregard the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. Because the precedents in this area are sufficiently malleable, the
Court is able to do generally whatever it chooses. Nevertheless, the majority left
unconstitutional conditions analysis more confused than it found it, and that is
no mean feat. Unconstitutional conditions analysis may now play a seriously
diminished role in the viewpoint-conditioned subsidy case because
straightforward viewpoint discrimination analysis seems more appropriate, at
least when it is applicable. That seemed to be the case throughout the Finley
litigation.188
VI. A SUGGESTED RERATIONALIZATION OF FINLEY
The majority opinion in Finley is a confusing stew of partially complete and
inconsistent arguments. Justice Scalia’s concurrence was clearly developed but
too radical a break from existing doctrine to attract a majority of the Court.
Justice Souter’s argument was well reasoned and largely consistent with
existing doctrine and yet he was unable to obtain even one other vote. The Court
did not provide even a minimally persuasive rationale for its holding.
Inconsistencies in the opinion suggest that this may largely be attributable to
sharp doctrinal and theoretical disagreements on the Court. Under such
186. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
188. Arguably, Finley is additional evidence that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves no
useful purpose that is not already achieved by more pertinent doctrines and thus should be abandoned. See
Sunstein,  supra note 165. Professor Schauer has suggested that the Court’s opinion in Finley may be the
“epitaph” for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Schauer, supra note 147.
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circumstances, it would be pointless to ask the Court to convincingly explicate a
rationale that a majority of the Justices refused to accept.189 The Cour  can only
provide as much guidance and explanation as is practicable.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the Court deliberately obscured its
analysis for strategic reasons. Perhaps it decided that upholding the existing
political compromise was definitely in the public interest but difficult to achieve
under present First Amendment doctrine that the Court felt should not be
altered. A solid majority may have coalesced around the result and agreed to
produce an opinion that, through its obscurity, does as little damage as possible
to free speech jurisprudence. Finley might then be compared to some of the
Court’s decisions in the early 1950s that undermined the Smith Act and other
anticommunist legislation without provoking a direct constitutional
confrontation.190
It is also possible, however, that some of the Justices who joined the opinion
of the Court, indeed perhaps all of them, believed that upholding section
954(d)(1) represented the correct understanding of the First Amendment and not
simply a prudentially defensible result. If so, the majority failed to explain
adequately why that was the case. This Part argues that the decency and respect
criteria are intuitively defensible and can be accommodated with free speech
doctrine and theory with a minimum amount of destabilization. Still, it is
debatable whether a clearer and more forthright approach that alters existing
First Amendment doctrine is preferable to an obscure and disingenuous
approach that may do less harm.
A. Attempted Justification
1. Deference to Legislative Compromise?
The question that should have dominated the Finley decision is whether any
legitimate public justification exists for the decency and respect clauses of
section 954(d). Some explanation of purpose or justification seems particularly
warranted given that the provision seems to be viewpoint discriminatory. Thus,
189. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).
190. In a series of cases in the 1950s following Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), in
which the Court sustained the constitutionality of the Smith Act, the Court narrowed the impact of
anticommunist control legislation on free speech values through statutory construction and evidentiary
rulings rather than broader and possibly more controversial First Amendment holdings. See, e.g., Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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the quest for justification starts with recognition that section 954(d) appears to
be highly problematic under the First Amendment. Is there a public purpose
capable of sustaining this legislation? One of the most striking aspects of the
majority opinion in Finley is that it never attempts to define the contours of that
public purpose or justification. At most, it describes the statutory amendment as
an attempt to strike a compromise between those who favored elimination of the
NEA, those who favored strict prohibition of specific types of artwork, those
who favored some less particular but still meaningful restraint on NEA
discretion, and those who favored no restriction beyond artistic excellence.191
The attempt to find a politically acceptable compromise among these various
factions may go a long way toward explaining how section 954(d) emerged as
the resolution of the arts funding controversy, but it does not explain why this
specific vehicle—the decency and respect clause—serves a sufficiently
important public purpose to justify its inherent viewpoint-discriminatory nature.
The reader of Finley is left with the feeling that the Court was afraid to discuss
the purpose of the provision for fear that this purpose was indefensible or at
least insufficient.
If the purpose of the amendment was simply to prohibit, discourage, or
punish the creation and display of a category of offensive views and
perspectives (artwork that is indecent or disrespectful)—either because those
views were unpopular or as a means of skewing debate in favor of alternative
views—then it would seem that the law should be considered a forbidden
example of viewpoint discrimination. Not only would this purpose be
insufficient, it would even be illegitimate. Such a law could be saved only by
concluding, as Justice Scalia did, that First Amendment principles do not apply
to subsidization decisions.
2. Concern for Taxpayer Sensibilities
The Court did set forth another justification that it never really considered.
Congress created this justification when it enacted section 954(d) along with
amendments to the declaration of findings and purposes of the Act, stating that
arts funding should “contribute to public support and confidence in the use of
taxpayer funds.”192 Presumably, Congress was exhibiting a legitimate interest in
protecting the taxpaying public from being forced to subsidize art that deeply
191. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2176 (1998).
192. 20 U.S.C. § 951(5) (1994).
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offends a large segment of society (most likely a majority) because of its
indecency or disrespect for widely shared beliefs and values. As a result, the
decency and respect clause was not intended to censor or discourage the creation
of offensive art or to skew the marketplace of art and ideas in favor of
Government approved orthodoxy. Accordingly, artists may continue to be as
indecent and disrespectful as they desire. They simply should not be allowed to
inflict on the taxpaying public the indignity of having to pay for such art.
Congressional debates reflected such a position. Representative Rohrabacher
concisely summarized the principle as “on their time with their dime.”193 In an
earlier debate, Senator Helms, a leading proponent of restricting the NEA,
argued that the American people “have a right not to be denigrated, offended, or
mocked with their own tax dollars” and that “no artist has a preemptive claim
on the tax dollars of the American people.”194 During the debate before the
House of Representatives in 1990, Representative Coleman, a cosponsor of the
provision that became section 954(d), explained:
[W]e want more accountability to the taxpayer without intruding on the
constitutional creativity and rights of all Americans. . . .
 . . . Works which deeply offend the sensibilities of significant
portions of the public ought not be supported with public funds. That is a
statement of common sense, of prudence, of sensibility to the beliefs and
values of those who, after all, pay the taxes to support this Federal
agency.”195
Several other members of Congress expressed similar sentiments.196
Section 954(d) is arguably aimed at a type of harm distinct from the harm
prohibited by the rule against viewpoint discrimination. The latter precludes the
state from suppressing dangerous or offensive ideas, punishing purveyors of
such ideas, or skewing the debate against such ideas. In contrast, the respect and
decency clauses simply seek to relieve the public of the indignity of compelled
193. Frohnmayer, supra note 132, at 2 (quoting Representative Rohrabacher).
194. 135 CONG. REC. 16,278 (1989) (statements of Sen. Helms).
195. 136 CONG. REC. 28,623, 28,624 (1990) (statement of Rep. Coleman).
196. See id. at 28,636 (statement of Representative Roth) (“the American people have really been
outraged by what is taking place because they feel that their hard-earned tax dollars are being used to fund
obscene and blasphemous art, and I think that is pretty well the long and short of it”); id. at 28,639
(statement of Representative Armey) (“I do not believe we should spend NEA money for the enjoyment of
artists. I believe we should spend NEA money for the enjoyment of the public, if we spend it at all, and
that NEA grants should reflect the public’s sensibilities and values.”); id. at 28,651 (statement of
Representative Walker) (“It is a question of whether or not tax money should be coerced away from hard-
working Americans in order to pay for things which they regard as very obscene.”).
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sponsorship of a certain category of highly offensive artwork. If this is true, a
number of issues remain open. Is the interest in protecting the taxpayer from the
harm caused by compelled sponsorship of indecent or disrespectful art a
legitimate interest, and is it significant enough to justify viewpoint
discrimination in the subsidization context? Does the protection of this interest
nevertheless inflict too much harm on free speech values in the arts funding
context to permit its recognition? Finally, would recognizing such an exception
to the viewpoint-discrimination principle cut too deeply into established First
Amendment doctrine to be tolerable?
These issues are serious, and for many they are insurmountable.
Nevertheless, section 954(d) can be justified on the grounds of protecting
taxpayers from being forced to sponsor indecent and disrespectful work.
Notwithstanding the justification, whether it is preferable to the Court’s
somewhat messier approach remains uncertain.
B. Consideration of Taxpayer Sensibilities as a Justification for
Viewpoint Discrimination
Easily the cleanest way to justify section 954(d) is to contend, as does
Justice Scalia, that free speech principles simply do not apply to subsidization
decisions. Once that step is taken, it scarcely matters what Congress did or why.
Assuming that section 954(d) is constitutionally acceptable, it is easy enough to
conjure up subsidization decisions that should not be. Presumably, most would
agree that a decision by Congress to subsidize only speech by Democrats, or
white people, or speech supportive of Government policy should be
unconstitutional. Justice Scalia indicates that he would handle such a parade of
horribles through other constitutional provisions,197 presumably equal
protection. Perhaps that would work if equal protection analysis was applied
with sufficient rigor. Given that these examples present the type of viewpoint
discrimination harm central to the First Amendment, however, it seems bizarre
to declare free speech analysis off limits. Instead, the First Amendment should
tolerate the decency and respect clause but not these other examples because the
harm to the taxpayer from being forced to fund indecent and disrespectful art is
a distinct and cognizable type of harm from which Congress should be able to
provide protection. In the context of federal arts funding, the discouragement if
not the outright prohibition of grants for indecent and disrespectful art will not
197. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2184 n.3 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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undermine free speech values to an unacceptable degree. Moreover, the
recognition of such an exception to the general principles against viewpoint
discrimination will not destabilize the existing doctrinal framework.
1. Protection Against Compelled Subsidization
Direct civil or criminal prohibition of indecent or disrespectful art clearly
would violate the First Amendment. To the extent that indecent art sends a
message or expresses a point of view that deeply offends some significant
segment of the public, this type of harm is simply a legitimate cost of freedom of
speech that the offended viewers must bear. They may “avert[] their eyes,” as
the Court has put it.198 I  is the additional indignity of forcing the taxpayers to
pay for art that assaults their most deeply held values in a manner violating
widely shared social norms that distinguishes this from the constitutionally
acceptable harm caused by the message itself.
The artist, with the help of the NEA, is to some extent compelling the
taxpayer to sponsor the creation of deeply offensive artwork. In this sense,
Senator Helms’ statement that the taxpayer has a right not to be mocked rings
true. The taxpayer certainly has no right to avoid being criticized, even with the
fruits of his labor, but taxpayers arguably should be able to preclude the
Government from forcing them to underwrite indecent assaults on their basic
values.199
In a series of cases, the Court has recognized that the First Amendment
precludes the state from compelling an individual to engage in expressive
activity to which he objects.200 The Court has also recognized a limited First
Amendment right to be free from having to pay fees or assessments that will be
used to promote causes or speech the individual finds objectionable, at least
where the promotion is not central to the mission of the institution.201 These
cases illustrate the significance of the interest in not being compelled to support
or fund objectionable messages. These compelled speech cases do not
198. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S 15, 21 (1971); see also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 211 (1975).
199. For the argument that in its managerial capacity the Government may permissibly use its
subsidization decisions to reenforce widely shared social norms such as decency and respect for diverse
beliefs and values, see Post, supra note 36, at 184-92.
200. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and BiSexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
201. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S.
1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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necessarily control the arts funding issue, however. While it is fair to say that
the taxpayer is imposed upon by NEA grants to artists who create indecent and
offensive works, the taxpayer is not required to participate in the creation of the
work in any active sense, nor is the taxpayer compelled to endorse or display the
message. Moreover, the decency and respect amendment presents the converse
of the Court’s mandatory funding cases. For instance, in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education,202 an individual asserted a First Amendment right to be
free from contributing funding to an objectionable cause that a majority of union
members presumably supported. Conversly, in the arts funding context, the
majority (through congressional legislation) decided to respect taxpayers’ claims
of conscience while a third party, the potential grant recipient, raised a First
Amendment objection to that decision. Compelled funding cases like Abood do
not resolve this controversy, but they bolster the contention that the interest in
not forcing taxpayers to financially support objectionable speech is a distinct
and cognizable injury worthy of legal recognition and respect.
That this is a legitimate interest does not suggest that every disgruntled
taxpayer has the right to complain about any disbursement of federal funds to
promote a message or cause with which he disagrees. Unlike the First
Amendment based compelled speech cases like Abood, the interest in protecting
the taxpayer in the arts funding context is asserted not by a dissenting member
of the polity but by the majority of Americans through the legislative process.
As a result, not every malcontent would have the power to bring the
Government to a halt. Professor Fiss argues that it is inappropriate to think of
Government funds as contributions from citizens in which they still have some
cognizable stake.203 Rather, it is the Government’s money to spend as it sees fit.
Doubtlessly, most Americans would reject this characterization. Assuming they
accept it, though, it would only be pertinent if dissenting taxpayers objected to
the Government’s actual disposition of the funds. In arts funding, the
Government allocates the funds in a way that attempts to take account of
taxpayer sensibilities.
2. Protecting Legitimate Taxpayer Sensibilities
Still, to contend that protecting taxpayer sensibilities is a legitimate
governmental interest is radically incomplete. The obvious question is protection
202. 431 U.S. 209.
203. See FISS, supra note 36, at 107 .
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against what. Section 954(d) provides the answer: protection against art that is
either indecent or disrespectful of the diverse beliefs and values of Americans.
Nevertheless, whether the taxpayer has a valid interest in being free of having to
sponsor art that infringes these values is a question section 954(d) does not
answer.
a. Decency
The concept of decency expresses a widely shared norm and has in certain
contexts withstood First Amendment challenge. Section 954(d)(1) did not define
indecency but rather referred to “general standards of decency.” At least one
source for such standards is from the definition that has made its way into the
law in the broadcasting context. It focuses on language and graphic depictions
that are patently offensive by contemporary community standards because they
depict sexual or excretory activities or organs.204 This reflects a widely held
though scarcely universal belief that graphic depictions of sexuality and
excretory activity are inappropriate, at least in public. This would cover the
most controversial of the Mapplethorpe photographs that ignited the NEA
funding controversy, and arguably Serrano’s Piss Christ as well. It is fair to say
that much if not most of the anger directed at NEA funding decisions was
provoked by the knowledge that the taxpayer was paying for patently offensive
art of a sexually explicit nature.
While indecent but nonobscene speech (and art) is protected by the First
Amendment, the state has the right to prohibit its broadcast over the public
airwaves during those hours when children are most likely to be listening or
watching.205 Admittedly, section 954(d)(1) has nothing to do with protecting
children. Nevertheless, at the heart of the concept of indecency is the rather
obvious recognition that for most people, sexuality is largely a private and
deeply personal matter—for many, a sacred matter. Thus, for a large segment
of the public, sexually explicit art is extraordinarily offensive, inappropriate,
and indeed immoral. Although the First Amendment protects indecent but
nonobscene speech, the fact that the Court has addressed the constitutionality of
legislative and administrative attempts to regulate indecent speech in so many
204. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (quoting In re Pacifica Found., 56
F.C.C. 2d 94, 98 (1975) (declaratory order)).
205. See id.; see also Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1043 (1996).
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different media contexts during the past twenty years206 i dicates that the value
of decency is a widely shared and deeply felt societal norm.207
b. Respect for Diverse Beliefs and Values
Unlike indecency, the concept of respect for the diverse beliefs and values of
the American people has no established legal pedigree.208 R ad literally, it might
disfavor any artwork that is highly critical of almost anything that some segment
of the population holds dear. Such a reading would cut deeply into free
discourse in the art world because it would suggest that anything controversial
is almost by definition a problematic candidate for funding. In context, however,
there is no reason to read the phrase so broadly. When coupled with indecency
and considered with the circumstances giving rise to the adoption of section
954(d), the concept of respect for diverse beliefs and values should be read to
encompass works, such as Serrano’s Piss Christ, that deliberately assault
deeply cherished values or deliberately inflict pain in a manner that transgresses
widely shared norms of propriety.
Blasphemous art would often be considered sufficiently disrespectful of
diverse beliefs and values. Likewise, racial hate speech or particularly offensive
depictions of women or homosexuals would also violate this norm as would
particularly insensitive treatment of the dead. If limited to artwork that a large
segment of the public would consider to be well beyond the bounds of legitimate
comment and criticism, the respect criteria does not prohibit vigorous and
pointed criticism of the status quo through publicly financed art. Indeed, the
emphasis on “diverse” beliefs and values ensures that it does not simply
enshrine majoritarian preferences. Rather, it applies only to that art which is
clearly beyond the pale of civil discourse.
One difficulty with the foregoing construction is that it arguably attempts to
achieve the same goals as the Rohrabacher amendment that was rejected in
206. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (indecency on Internet); Denver Area Educ.
Television Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (indecency on leased and public access cable
channels); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (indecency over telephone);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecency on public radio airwaves).
207. Cf. Post, supra note 36, at 191 (making observation that “the fact that family values are popular
and commonly shared, or, in Fiss’s demeaning term, ‘orthodox,’ would not be grounds for abandoning a
posture of judicial deference because, as we have seen, these attributes are precisely what authenticate the
government’s support of family values as reasonable and legitimate”).
208. Respect for diverse beliefs and values presents greater First Amendment problems than the
concept of decency, but if construed narrowly, it is also can coexist with freedom of speech in the
subsidization context.
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favor of the current section 954(d). Congressman Rohrabacher’s alternative
would have prohibited the use of NEA grants for the depiction, promotion,
distribution, or dissemination of, among other things: denigration of “the beliefs,
tenets, or objects of a particular religion” or of a group or individual “on the
basis of race, sex, handicap, or national origin,” or of work in which the U.S.
flag is “mutilated, defaced, physically defiled, [or] burned.”209 Arguably,
Congress may not have intended respect for diverse beliefs and values to bear
the interpretation offered here simply because it largely parallels the rejected
Rohrabacher approach. This is not a particularly persuasive objection, however.
Certainly, Congress meant something by the phrase “respect for diverse beliefs
and values.” From a free speech standpoint, a narrower or limited interpretation
seems preferable to one that would disfavor art work that was to any extent
critical or disrespectful. More significantly, despite an overlap in purpose
between the Rohrabacher amendment and any plausible construction of the
“respect” criteria, section 954(d) is easily distinguishable and was no doubt
preferable to a majority of the House. Section 954(d) merely required the NEA
to take decency and respect into consideration as opposed to flatly prohibiting
funding. Additionally, it did not specify the prohibited perspectives with the
troublesome particularity exhibited by the Rohrabacher amendment.
C. Impact on Freedom of Speech
1. The Selective Subsidization Context
Decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values are widely shared social
norms that deserve consideration and support. It is well settled, however, that
the First Amendment protects indecent and disrespectful speech, and the state
cannot prohibit or censor such speech.210 This is certainly the case with respect
to blasphemy,211 racial hate speech,212 and nonobscene pornography,213 even
though these types of speech can inflict significant personal and societal harm.
Therefore, if section 954(d) is constitutionally acceptable, it must be because the
state has greater authority to employ viewpoint-oriented criteria in the
209. 136 CONG. REC. 28,657 (1990) (amendments en bloc offered by Congressman Rohrabacher).
210. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. 844; see also, e.g., Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Fighting Back: Offensive
Speech and Cultural Conflict, 46 SMU L. REV. 145 (1992).
211. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
212. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
213. See American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
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subsidization context.
There are good reasons why this should be the case. First, as previously
noted,214 there is the significant interest in a subsidization context in avoiding the
potential indignity suffered by the taxpayer as a result of compelled sponsorship
that does not exist in a regulatory setting. Equally as important, the use of the
decency and respect criteria in competitive subsidization decisions generally
results in less harm to free speech values. Critical to this analysis is the fact that
the Government has no affirmative duty to subsidize speech or art.215 Thus, any
cognizable harm to free speech interests flows from a decision to selectively
subsidize, as in the NEA funding context, rather than from a decision not to
subsidize at all. This is critical because subsidization of speech, indeed even
viewpoint-based selective subsidization, will generally increase rather than
diminish the amount of speech or art available. By definition, a competitive
grant program, such as the NEA arts funding, awards funds to one artist and
inevitably denies them to many others. If selective subsidization decisions harm
free speech interests, it is not because many artists find it more difficult to create
their work due to lack of Government funding. Rather, it is because Congress
created selection criteria or the process that has skewed the marketplace in favor
of or against a particular topic, perspective, or viewpoint.216
Because decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values are viewpoint
oriented, the risk of distorting the source of harm to free speech is certainly
present. Art that challenges social conventions through indecency or disrespect
for beliefs and values will be disadvantaged, at least with respect to federal
funding. Two factors, however, should significantly mitigate the impact on the
marketplace of ideas. First, as the Finley majority observed, Congress did not
target narrower or more specific viewpoints. As previously noted,217 this d es
not render the decency and respect criteria viewpoint neutral, but it does
minimize the degree to which an artist would be precluded from creating art that
conveys a critical perspective. Second, although the impact of NEA funding on
the production of art is hotly contested,218 it s ems highly unlikely that indecent
and disrespectful art are even minimally dependent on federal subsidization for
continued existence.219 The very notion that artists could not adequately
214. See supra Part VI.A.2.
215. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2186 n.2 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting).
216. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831-32 (1995).
217. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
218. See Post, supra note 36, at 193-94 n.208 (summarizing research on this issue).
219. See Hamilton, supra note 36, at 118 (arguing that the art world is not dependent on federal
funding for its vitality much less its survival). But see Donald W. Hawthorne, Subversive Subsidization:
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challenge social norms by violating those norms absent the financial support of
the very people whose norms are being violated seems too bizarre to be taken
seriously.220 Consequently, the danger of skewing the marketplace against
indecent and disrespectful art, though hardly nonexistent, is certainly
insubstantial in this context. Finally, section 954(d) only calls for consideration
of decency and respect. As the Court mentioned, Congress has not totally
precluded the subsidization of indecent or disrespectful art.221 This further
mitigates the actual impact of the decency and respect criteria on the artistic
marketplace of ideas. It should be noted, however, that a focus on the harm to
the taxpayer would not necessarily distinguish between taking these factors into
consideration and prohibiting funding outright. Arguably, “consideration” is the
most that freedom of speech can afford to grant the taxpayer. But if the
taxpayer truly has a significant interest in not being compelled to sponsor
offensive art, the interest would be protected more effectively by outright
prohibition than by mere consideration. That type of taxpayer protection,
however, cuts more deeply into First Amendment interests than does the Court’s
approach. Because Congress only required consideration in section 954(d), this
problem need not be confronted.
2. An Exception to the Rule Against Viewpoint Discrimination
Permitting Congress to protect the taxpaying public against having to
subsidize highly offensive art may cause only minimal harm to the artistic
marketplace of ideas, but it might cause more serious harm to the Court’s
established free speech doctrine. As Justice Souter noted, the prohibition against
viewpoint discrimination is a fundamental principle of modern free speech
doctrine.222 At the very least, viewpoint discrimination is not constitutionally
permissible absent a compelling state interest.223Protecting the taxpayer against
compelled subsidization of offensive speech is a legitimate interest, arguably
even a substantial interest, but scarcely a compelling state interest as the Court
uses the term.224 Thus, conceding that the state could use at least certain
How NEA Art Funding Abridges Private Speech, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 443-44 (1992).
220. See generally Daniel Shapiro, Free Speech and Art Subsidies, 14 LAW & PHIL. 329, 344
(1995).
221. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2176 (1998); see also supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
222. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
223. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118
(1991); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
224. There is no clear agreement as to what interests are compelling under the First Amendment, but
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/1
p1 Bloom.doc 05/20/99   11:42 AM
1999] NEA V. FINLEY 47
viewpoint-discriminatory criteria in the subsidization context would create an ad
hoc exception to well-established doctrine. Considering the foregoing analysis,
however, such an exception is justifiable and readily limited to the subsidization
context. Nevertheless, any explicit exception to the rule against viewpoint
discrimination is cause for some concern.
Presumably, such concern is why the Finley majority was so reluctant to
acknowledge that decency and respect were viewpoint oriented. Justices Scalia
and Souter demonstrated that the criteria are in fact viewpoint based. Because
they were probably correct in their demonstrations, although, as the majority
believes, the criteria could have been much more viewpoint oriented, the options
are to follow Justice Souter and conclude that section 954(d) is unconstitutional
on its face, to follow Justice Scalia and conclude that First Amendment
principles do not apply to subsidies at all, or to contend that this particular
instance of viewpoint discrimination is constitutionally justifiable.225
3. The Advantages of a Taxpayer Exception
The third alternative above is more candid and less confusing than the
majority’s approach. Also, it inflicts less damage to established First
Amendment doctrine than Justice Scalia’s approach. It cannot be executed,
however, without at least some deviation from the Court’s seemingly ironclad
rule against viewpoint discrimination promoted by Justice Souter. Much can be
said in favor of constructing and honoring bright-line rules to preserve freedom
of expression.226 If doctrine were inviolable, however, Justice Souter would have
written the majority opinion in Finley invalidating section 954(d). Dissenting
from the court of appeals’ opinion in Finley that followed existing doctrine to its
logical conclusion, Judge Kleinfeld observed that “[t]he First Amendment does
one may assume that these would be interests of the highest social order, such as protecting national
security or preventing imminent acts of violence. See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling
Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L.
REV. 917 (1988).
225. For the recognition that “some forms of viewpoint discrimination by government enterprises are
permissible and some forms are not,” see Schauer, supra note 147, at 106.
226. See Schauer, supra note 147, at 111; Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the
First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 474-80 (1985). See generally Frederick Schauer, Codifying
the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 313-15; Frederick Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981) (discussing
“categorization” in First Amendment jurisprudence); Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing
advantages of rules over standards and vice versa).
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not prohibit the free exercise of common sense.”227 A limited exception to the
rule against viewpoint discrimination in the arts funding context makes sense,
can be confined (at least to the subsidization context), and arguably explains
and justifies the Finley decision—and hence the current state of the law—more
adequately than the Finley majority opinion.
a. A Sensible Fit with Rosenberger
Perhaps the most significant challenge to any attempted justification of
section 954(d) is whether it can be squared with the recent decision in
Rosenberger. Although Rosenberger was decided by a far narrower margin
than Finley, it seems correctly decided and nothing in Finley advocates its
reconsideration. Indeed, the author of the primary dissent in Rosenberger,
Justice Souter, considered it to be the controlling precedent in Finley. Thus, an
explanation of the result in Finley must account for the decision in
Rosenberger.
One might distinguish Rosenberger’s holding on the ground that publishing
material with a distinct religious perspective is not nearly as offensive, and thus
not as great of an imposition on the unwilling taxpayer, as is indecent or
disrespectful art. A lengthy Establishment Clause tradition, however, dating at
least as far back as Jefferson’s Bill of Religious Liberties228 and Madison’s
Remonstrance,229 could be cited to the contrary. Instead, the focus on the harm
to the taxpayer as a result of compelled subsidization provides the best basis for
distinguishing Rosenberger.
The majority in Finley distinguished Rosenberger on the ground that the
subsidy in that case was widely available while the one at issue in Finley was
awarded on a competitive basis. The majority failed, however, to adequately
explain why this should matter. Arguably, this distinction is significant. The
offense to the taxpayer should not be as great where it is understood that the
recipient of a subsidy who uses it to engage in offensive speech or to create
offensive art was entitled to the grant as a matter of course, and was not subject
to a discretionary choice by the Government to single out offensive art and
reward it. In the context of a broad-based nondiscretionary grant program such
227. Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671, 684 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
228. See An act for establishing religious freedom, 12 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, HENING’S
STATUTES AT LARGE 84 (University Press of Virginia 1969) (1823) (“An act for establishing religious
freedom”).
229. See Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
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as in Rosenberger, the taxpayer should obviously understand that the
Government had little choice but to award the grant. That fact may not wholly
eliminate the indignity of being forced to subsidize offensive speech, but it
should go a long way toward minimizing it.
In a sense, Justice Scalia’s distinction of Rosenberger as a public-forum
case makes the same point. Allowing speakers to use a public forum is a type of
subsidy, but because it is made available on a nondiscretionary basis, the
taxpayer should understand that the Government is not using public funds to
select and prefer an offensive assault on community norms; rather, it is simply
playing host to all points of view. The Court recognized this understanding in
Capitol Square v. Pinette,230 in which the plurality opinion explained that a
cross erected by the Ku Klux Klan in a public forum on the capitol grounds
would be perceived as private speech rather than as a Government endorsement
of religion.231
230. 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (plurality opinion).
231. See id. at 760-63.
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b. A Narrow Focus Limiting Future Misuse
A rationale of Finley focusing on the harm to the taxpayer is significantly
narrower than both Justice Scalia’s approach and the approach hinted at in
section II-B of the Court’s opinion, each to the effect that the First Amendment
has little if any application to subsidization decisions. Such a rationale assumes
that free speech principles, including the rule against viewpoint discrimination,
generally apply to Government subsidies, at least to the extent left open by Rust
v. Sullivan. The rationale also simply recognizes a specific exception.
A taxpayer-focused explanation of Finley presents both advantages and
disadvantages compared to the majority’s approach. Perhaps its greatest
advantage, its simplicity and clarity, is also its greatest disadvantage. As a
general rule, clarity in judicial opinions is desirable because they explain the law
and provide guidance for the future. An opinion such as the majority opinion in
Finley, which seems based on a complicated combination of several
considerations, some of which seem inconsistent with others, offers little
guidance or predictability. Nevertheless, if Finley represents a prudential
decision to validate a political compromise designed to lay to rest a nagging
controversy, then perhaps guidance and predictability are not paramount. If the
Finley Court needed to deviate from established doctrine in order to bring
closure to the arts funding controversy, then doing so in a clear and precise
manner may not necessarily have been a virtue. A muddled opinion may inflict
less harm on First Amendment values than one which attempts to stake out a
more clearly understandable exception. On the other hand, it may cause greater
harm. Several themes could be extracted from the Finley opinion and used to
limit free speech. For example, the Finley opinion could be used to argue that
viewpoint-based criteria are not viewpoint based after all. Also, it could be used
to argue that only the most specific viewpoint discrimination can be challenged
in an on-the-face attack. Additionally, it could be used to argue that there is a
wide berth for the use of viewpoint-oriented criteria in a competitive selection
process. Finally, it could be used to argue that the First Amendment scarcely
applies in the subsidy context. While the confused nature of the opinion might
limit its impact, it might also render it capable of producing all sorts of mischief.
A rationale focusing on the harm to taxpayers creates an exception to the
protective prohibition against viewpoint discrimination, but it is a narrow and
defined exception, limited to highly offensive speech in the subsidization
context. Any precedent can be misused, but there is arguably less danger lurking
within this focused rationale than in the scattershot approach of the Finley
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majority opinion.
c. A More Satisfying Explanation
The taxpayer-focused approach is an arguably sounder approach because it
addresses the central question of the purpose of section 954(d) that the majority
opinion completely ignores. Generally, it is difficult to explain why a
controversial limitation on freedom of speech is constitutional without
confronting what the limitation is intended to accomplish; yet, that is precisely
what the Finley Court seemed to do. The Finley majority treated section 954(d)
as simply the result of a political compromise designed to salvage the NEA,
offering no further independent justification. The Court made no attempt, aside
from emphasizing pure political expediency, to explain why decency and respect
were chosen rather than some other alternative. This hardly seems sufficient to
justify viewpoint-discriminatory criteria.
Arguably, the Court may have avoided consideration of a taxpayer-
protective justification because it appeared to be an improper statutory purpose.
The respondents so argued in their brief, asserting that the congressional
emphasis on taxpayer confidence was simply a thinly disguised rationalization
of viewpoint discrimination.232 Notwithstanding the Court’s possible concerns,
the justification should be acceptable as long as its purpose or impact is not to
suppress offensive artwork or to exclude such artwork from the marketplace,
but rather to channel the funding of such artwork from the public to the private
sphere. If the Court believed that protecting the confidence or sensibilities of the
taxpaying public was an improper or inadequate justification, and if it was
unable to identify any other acceptable purpose, then it should have invalidated
the law.
D. Three Other Possible Criticisms
Three other possible criticisms of this alternative rationale of Finley can be
made, all of which can also be leveled at the majority opinion itself, at least to
some extent. First, one might argue that an explicit exclusion of indecent and
disrespectful art from public subsidization fails to appreciate the role of art. It
critiques, often quite mercilessly, society, dominant culture, the status quo, and
232. Respondents Brief at *13, NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (No. 97-371), available in
1998 WL 47281.
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previous artistic movements.233 Much of the art that is likely to encounter
resistence under the decency or respect clause is oppositional art; that is, art
intended to assault, outrage, and even repel the viewer, presumably in an
attempt to get him or her to reconsider entrenched biases.234 Arguably, if the
purpose of at least some art is to engage in a radical critique of the status quo, it
is antithetical to deprive it of funding simply because it does what it is supposed
to do well.
Nevertheless, the critical function of art can be overstated. Even assuming
that good art is often critical, it does not follow that any more than a small
percentage of art will be indecent or disrespectful of diverse beliefs and cultures
(at least in the extreme sense that the phrase used in section 954(d)(1) should be
interpreted). Artists have an all but infinite number of ways to mount scathing
attacks on contemporary mores with little fear of running aground of the
decency and respect criteria. To the extent that oppositional art and section
954(d)(1) are on a collision course, it is not due to a failure to understand or
appreciate such art, but rather to a deliberate value choice to limit the extent to
which the public must suffer the insult of having to pay for art that attacks its
most basic beliefs and values in a particularly offensive way. Proponents of
oppositional art will disagree with this choice, but they must understand that it is
not a choice that can be explained only as a consequence of artistic ignorance.
A second criticism is that section 954(d) and virtually any of its defenses fail
to appreciate the degree to which the art world generally, or publicly subsidized
art in particular, is a traditional sphere of robust and unrestrained discourse.235
As such, publicly subsidized art is the equivalent of a public forum in which
viewpoint discrimination is strictly prohibited.
The short response to this criticism, as the Court recognized, is that the
competitive and selective nature of the NEA grant program distinguishes it from
an open forum. A program that, by definition, is limited to works judged to be
233. See generally Hamilton, supra note 36, at 77-107; Courtney Randolph Nea, Content
Restrictions and National Endowment for the Arts Funding: An Analysis from the Artist’s Perspective,
2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 165, 174-77 (1993); Shapiro, supra note 220, at 344. It can even be argued
that postmodern movements in art, which challenge the very idea that there can be determinations of
artistic excellence or that art is to be taken seriously, ensure that NEA grants will be sought for the type of
offensive artwork that led to the initial arts funding controversy. See Pamela Weinstock, Note, The
National Environment for the Arts Funding Controversy and the Miller Test: A Plea for the
Reunification of Art and Society, 72 B.U. L. REV. 803 (1992).
234. See FISS, supra note 36, at 104.
235. See generally Cole, supra note 36; Thomas P. Leff, The Arts: A Traditional Sphere of Free
Expression? First Amendment Implications of Government Funding to the Arts in the Aftermath of
Rust v. Sullivan, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 353 (1995).
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artistically excellent and is structured to provide support primarily to well-
established institutions will operate like a public forum more by happenstance
than by design. An arts subsidy program could be created with the primary
purpose of encouraging vigorous debate and critique, but, rhetoric in the
legislation notwithstanding,236 Congress did not create such an arts funding
program. To so characterize it is to mischaracterize it.
A final criticism, building on the work of Owen Fiss, would take the prior
argument a step further and maintain that the point of an art subsidy program is
to promote democratic discourse enabling people to engage in intelligent self-
government.237 As such, the state is under a First Amendment based obligation
to favor art that is critical and expresses a perspective that is less likely to be
favored by market forces alone.238 U der this approach, the state must not only
tolerate art such as Mapplethorpe’s photographs, it must also affirmatively seek
it out and promote it, even at the expense of favoring it over more artistically
meritorious work.239 Professor Fiss makes clear that his approach is based on a
communal-interventionist view of the First Amendment that is quite
incompatible with the individualistic approach favored by the Court over at least
the past three decades240 (and indeed throughout most of the entire history of the
Court’s encounters with the First Amendment).
Section 954(d)(1), which Professor Fiss conceded would be upheld under the
Court’s dominant approach,241 and the Finley decision, whether justified by the
majority, by Justice Scalia, or by a taxpayer-oriented rationale, both conceived
of freedom of speech from a totally different perspective than does Professor
Fiss. Even Justice Souter’s dissent falls squarely within the individualistic
tradition of which Professor Fiss disapproves. A vision of the First Amendment
that imposes on the state an obligation to subsidize ideas or perspectives that are
often too indecent or offensive to survive in our rather vulgar marketplace of
ideas is fortunately not the vision of freedom of speech adopted by our dominant
legal culture.
VII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the arts funding controversy is over. If so, the Court played a role,
236. See 20 U.S.C. § 951 (1994).
237. See FISS, supra note 36, at 101.
238. See id. at 101-04.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 12-15.
241. See id. at 97.
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though not a decisive one, in laying it to rest. In most respects, the decision in
NEA v. Finley is anticlimactic. It did not solve the problem; it only blessed the
solution. Nor did it take the occasion to develop clear and coherent legal
principles for meeting the challenge. Instead, it went out of its way to do the
opposite, perhaps because of internal disagreement, perhaps because of
doctrinal constraints, or perhaps because of prudential considerations. This
Article has attempted to show that the Court could have offered a somewhat
clearer and arguably more intuitive and candid justification for its decision.
Even so, it is uncertain whether it should have. In view of the eight to one vote
in Finley, it seems obvious that the decency and respect criteria of section
954(d) were destined to survive constitutional challenge. The result is a
Supreme Court decision upholding viewpoint-discriminatory legislation,
whether or not the Court is willing to admit it. Such a decision arguably sets a
dangerous precedent for freedom of speech values, although much can be said
for the Court’s minimalistic, “incompletely theorized” approach, as Professor
Sunstein might describe it. The Court could have offered a simpler and more
direct explanation that, if limited to the context in which it arose, would not
unduly damage the Court’s speech protective doctrinal framework. Such a
rationale in Finley required five members of the Court willing to accept it, and
there is no reason to believe that might have been the case. The fact that this
justification was raised at least obliquely by the Government in its brief suggests
that it may not have been attractive to a majority of the Court. Nevertheless, it is
the most candid and intuitively sensible way to uphold the decency and respect
criteria.
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